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Introduction
Few people today would
remember a world not dominated by
the United States (US). This dominance
was received with a mix of acceptance,
challenge and controversy but one way
or the other American foreign policy
for more than half a century has
exerted a powerful influence across
much of the world. Naturally, the
leadership and supremacy of the
United States was a decisive feature of
the 20th century dynamics of Latin
America’s insertion and hence on how
our regional relations evolved.
The rise of Asia in general and
China in particular have changed this
basic setting. A plurality of power
sources, economic drivers and world
views have flourished in the last
decade and coexist with the United
States offers. China’s sheer material
presence on the global stage is shaping
the behavior of most other states. This
scenario challenges the formerly
predominant understanding of how we
conceptualize and analyse regional
pragmatic cooperation around key
issues of development and conflict
beyond dogmatisms.
Regionalism in the 21st century
takes place in a post-hegemonic
framework that is fundamentally
different form the ‘hegemonic
moment’ of 20th century. Moreover,
the almost complete absence of the US
has been a noteworthy aspect of the
global health crisis brought about by
Covid19 and has allowed China, Russia
and India to practice what has been
dubbed as vaccine diplomacy. China, in
particular, seeking to expand health-
related infrastructure and innovation
capacity as part of the Belt and Road
Initiative. This speaks to the country’s
broader push to position itself as a
global health leader, an ambition that
has been very much in evidence during
the pandemic. The drive both
geopolitical and geoeconomics has
been compared to the operation of the
Marshall Plan. In short, new
crisscrossing in a number of issues
have the potential to accelerate the
shift in balance of the global standing
of the US and competitors in the
latter’s favour. Perceptions of the US
and its position at the centre of the
contemporary international order have
changed.
The value of regionalism is an
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multipolar world order operates
through different logic than
regionalism in the 20th century. In the
last two decades the importance of
regions and southern regionalism has
increased in global politics as a
consequence of such power changes
but also changes in ambitions and
initiatives anchored in different areas
of policy where acting regionally made
sense to actors, mostly states, that
reclaimed the region as a sphere of
(shared) policy opportunities and
responsibilities. Conceptually, this was
captured in what we called post-
hegemonic regionalism (Riggirozzi and
Tussie 2012, 2017) to describe the
scenario that characterised Latin
American regionalism in the last two
decades. The idea of post-hegemonic
regionalism builds from Amitav
Acharya’s 2009 work where he
envisages the end of United States (US)
hegemony and proposes
conceptualising a world order of
multiple competitions, a scenario that
he calls multiplex world (Acharya 2009;
2014; 2017). The central feature of a
multiplex order is that it does not have
a single line of control, or one meta
narrative about the form and drive of
global order. One of the manifestations
of the multiplex order has been the
emergence of new creditors to the
region which after World War II lied
tightly in the hands of the US. We have
built on that concept to focus on how
post-hegemonic regionalism has
become manifest. To a large extent
post-hegemonic regionalism grew at
odds with US hemispheric ambitions of
extending its reach. It grew in a context
of weakened US hegemony in Latin
America.
This article proposes an
analysis of the development of post-
hegemonic strategies in Latin America
during the last two decades. In the
second section, we review the
emergence of the strategy and its
meaning in the light of multilateralism.
In the next section, we analyse in detail
the main initiatives in the financial
sphere, perhaps one of the fields in
which the region tried, with mixed
success, to dispute the status quo.
Post-hegemonic regionalism in
context the context of multilateralism
The leadership and supremacy
of the United States was a decisive
feature of the 20th century dynamics in
the evolution of regionalism and
multilateralism. The US oversaw the
establishment of a series of strategic
alliances that were designed to deter
and counteract Soviet expansion. The
creation of the Bretton Woods
Institutions, the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund and
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) became a highly institutionalized
form of hegemonic influence and
provided enduring transmission
mechanism through which the US was
able to use carrots and sticks to ensure
consent and shape policies.
A combination of
grand strategy and economic statecraft
informed American strategy towards
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Latin America. To take the example of
Latin American pledges for an Inter-
American Bank, these can be traced
back until the International Conference
of American States in 1889, and had a
fledgling moment in the late 30’s when
the Roosevelt administration backed
the idea of an international bank
controlled by governments to promote
development. At the time, the US
competed with European powers as
credit creating managers. In Mexico,
Central America and the Andean
countries, the Kemmerer missions, the
so called money doctors, went from
country to country to assist in planting
financial order.
During the interwar years and
thereafter, private and public financial
institutions, practices, and interactions
significantly influenced the financial
relations between the US and a good
part of Latin America. The proposal for
a regional development bank was aired
but put to rest (Helleiner, 2017). The
precedent nevertheless influenced the
blueprint of the World Bank during the
Bretton Woods conferences in 1944.
By then the US was a unipole creditor,
who was bent on avoiding a loose
rope, not least in its backyard. In that
plan all development finance had to
come tightly under its orbit and solely
under the emerging multilateral order
to increase the use of the dollar. No
departure from the order was to be on
the cards. The stronghold of the US in
Latin America was far from being in
dispute. Latin America did have wiggle
room, capacity for initiatives but for
decades, inter-American debateswere
framed with reference (supportive or
not) to the US map.
As viewed by the US
regionalism was perceived as a
detraction from the encompassing
multilateralism that was to order the
world and break all remnants of
European imperialism. Regional
initiatives were seen as challengers to
the American project and American
predominance. In Latin America and
Asia the US worked assiduously to
undermine attempts to allow
institutions to advance regional trade.
A decade later, the Cuban revolution
softened by force the edges of that
doctrine in Latin America. Only at that
point, when the US’s stronghold
seemed at risk did the creation of the
Interamerican Development Bank see
the light. The Cuban Revolution placed
Latin America at the top of
Washington’s foreign policy agenda.
The Bank was given the task to deploy
the Alliance for Progress with the
purpose of tackling the causes
presumed to have sparked the Cuban
revolution, chiefly poverty and absence
of social policies. The long time
resistance to the project of the Latin
American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA) was lifted. The development
project of the 1950s-1960s turned its
concern to imposing order and
forestalling social unrest in the
strategic competition with the Soviet
Union. Development was, therefore,
premised on the western model and
modernisation theory, which posited
that less developed and under-
developed countries would eventually
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catch up with the advanced industrial
states if they followed western blueprints,
including progressively opening up trade
to their neighbors as a first step to global
opening in the successive trade rounds of
GATT of the time.
The end of the cold war
triggered another important shift
which gave rise to a new doctrine on
regionalism from the United States.
Communism was no longer a threat
but another match sprung up. Would
the European Economic Community,
deep into its self-reformation to
become the European Union, break
away? It was accused of becoming a
fortress and for their part, developing
countries of obstructing rapid
multilateral trade agreements.
Perceiving itself as the main winner to
which all countries would gravitate in a
rush for access to its market, the US
put the regionalist card on the table.
Now regionalism instead of a threat to
its plans, was preferred as a quick fix
for the triad of market liberalization,
deregulation and privatization that
would ensure juicy contracts for
American business abroad. Regional
arrangements offered an important
alternative to multilateralism when the
US was perceived as the only global
power and the US perceived itself as
the only game in town. The US began
to take the view that ‘if the multilateral
road is obstructed, then we will just
have to explore these other roads’. The
flagship project was the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the
first major regional trade agreement
signed by the United States since
Bretton Woods. Regionalism rather
than a stumbling block to the American
project was seen as a building block
insofar as it provided a locus where
countries could not band together.
That was the first of many stepping
stones that led to network of free
trade agreements signed with the
United States and among countries
that held agreements with the US. The
US was present in its ability to
structure hemispheric institutions and
shape the terms of debate
Come today, growing
geoeconomics competition between
the world’s major powers is a defining
feature of a new era; an examination
of its evolution helps to clarify what is
at stake in the possible decline of US
influence. Chinese accession to the
WTO in 2001 had been hailed as a
triumph of multilateralism. The WTO
would be the lever to force far-
reaching changes in China’s trade
regime and monitor reform. China’s
membership in the WTO would serve
U.S. interests by providing a
mechanism for dealing with inevitable
trade frictions on a multilateral rather
than a purely bilateral basis. A decade
later China was seen as encroaching
and free riding. The US called the WTO
“broken,” saying countries such as
China have taken advantage of it.
Trump also threatened to leave the
WTO accusing China of backpedalling"
on trade agreements. Finally, Roberto
Azevedo resigned as the head of the
WTO when the body came under
immense pressure to justify its
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relevance after the US effectively
paralyzed its ability to settle disputes.
Putting these cycles into perspective,
one of the major lessons of
international cooperation in the 21st
century is that multilateralism is
versatile. Rules change. Global
multilateral organisations are affected
by power politics as much as ambitions
of member states. Regionalism is not
exempt from versatility. The exit of the
United Kingdom from the European
Union effective in 2021, the
withdrawal of the US as member of the
World Health Organisation under the
Trump administration. In Latin America
the paralysis of organisations such as
Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) since 2015 are among
several examples. Certainly, global and
regional organisations coexist with
ideological frictions and situations
where altered interests of member
states in reaction to power
considerations and political-ideological
stands, may retrieve authority to
organisations (Quiliconi 2013). For
some this is a type of inevitable
defection. Defection is a major risk in
the sustainability of institutions beyond
and above the state (Keohane 2001).
Building from this notion and focusing
on regional organisation, scholars
associated with liberal pragmatism in
International Relations, hold that
institutions regularise patterns of
conduct by structuring practices and
controlling options through incentives
and enforcement mechanisms with
penalties for defection and
opportunities for remaining in the
game, all providing a degree of
certainty. In this paradigm, interests
and objectives are created in and to a
large extend because of institutions
that mitigate defection and allow
cooperation. In the study of
regionalism the weight placed on
institutions travelled a very long way to
claim that regional institutions can
lock-in sovereign states in
supranational decision-making
processes that mitigate the risk of
defection (Lenz and Marks 2016).
Binding the country to the masthead of
an international trade treaty, any
future reversal would have costs and
become more difficult to implement.
By contrast, realist arguments insisted
that states may be inclined to
cooperate but unless they cede their
sovereign power to supranational
institutions, integration is unlikely to
happen (Malamud 2013).
This conception of regionalism
as order guaranteed by supranational
institutions has dominated the study of
regionalism. In many ways, it sustained
a normative template inspired by the
European Union as the mother of all
regional governance. This is somehow
paradoxical as Latin America can be
argued to have been the true pioneer
of regionalism, a century before the
creation of the European Economic
Community (Fawcett 2005). Despite
the absence of economic
interdependence, political
interdependence has marked Latin
America’s long tradition of diverse
regional associations. We can trace the
roots of Southern regionalism to the
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19th Century when the processes of
independence and nation-building
arose with the end of European
colonialism and intervention. Regional
integration in Latin America, but also in
the global south at large, has been a
tool of national states to support and
coordinate ‘construction of
sovereignty’ particularly in transiting to
democracy (Deciancio 2016). In the
case of African nations, regional
agreements were seen as ways of
fostering political stability and much
needed economic development at the
end of the apartheid era (Schoeman
2002; Pallotti 2004). Similar
developments have unfolded in the
construction of autonomy and security
communities in Asia (Acharya 2014).
What this suggests is that Southern
regionalisms were shaped by the need
to develop a region free from
colonialism and struggles against the
long imperial arm. The Drago Doctrine,
that managed to reject the right of any
foreign power of using the force
against a nation for collecting debts, is
an outstanding precedent established
at the very beginning of XIX Century.
Likewise, constructing and supporting
sovereignty through regionalism has
made sense for states that have
historically struggled against external
powers; so, the construction of
Southern regionalisms is thus at odds
with the delegation of sovereignty to a
supranational communitarian authority
or institutions.
In this context, regional inter-
governmental institutions and
agreements were set up to help states
to address and coordinate the search
for some policy space, some economic
and political autonomy, an enduring
challenge in many Southern nations.
Acting regionally helped gain individual
and collected leverage in the presence
of harsh asymmetries of power.
Ultimately, even in context of friendly
alignment with the US, regional
arrangements were always seen as a
way of dealing with hegemony. In this
sense, post-hegemonic regionalism
evolved because of a history of
hegemony with actors seeking
institutional spaces and creating
processes to contest the statusquo.
There is broad agreement that
regionalism was jumpstarted into a
new phase in the early 21st Century
spurred by left leaning governments
and the locomotive provided by an
unprecedented commodity boom
levered by China. The boom in a
context of increased autonomy from
the string of the US was labelled
described the Commodity Consensus.
The United States and Venezuela were
each a frequent irritant to the other.
Venezuela sought to institutionalize
the Comunidad de Estados de
Latinoamerica y el Caribe (CELAC) vis-à-
vis the Organization of American States
which it regarded as a mechanism of
US domination. Argentina, for its part,
under the presidencies of Nestor and
Cristina Kirchner did not follow quite
the same anti-imperialist rhetoric, but
the country stood apart from the US in
the understanding of regionalism. The
turn to post-hegemonic regionalism
was the result of the government’s
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goal to implement an economic policy
under the banner of “neo-
developmentalism” which focused on
accelerating investment and
employment. Lula maintained Brazil’s
traditional friendly relations with the
United States but at the same time
championed initiatives such as
UNASUR, not aimed at outright
confrontation with the US. Instead, the
aim was to fend it off and seek
increased autonomy vis-à-vis the
hemispheric and global hegemon. On
the trade front, Brazilian governments
never went as far as to pursue an anti-
free-trade discourse but split the
relevance given to trade. While free
trade for agriculture was flagged high
globally with an active policy in the
WTO, the issue was altogether lost in
regionalism, as exemplified by the
exclusion of the proposal of creating a
South American Free Trade Area in the
framework of UNASUR or the
stagnation, with the noteworthy
exception of the car sector, of the
trade dimension in Mercosur. This
range of regional initiatives was, in
their very diversity, manifestations of
post-hegemonic regionalism.
The end of a political cycle of left
leaning governments was seen as the
death knell. In that sense, the camp
has been narrowly characterized as a
split between optimists and pessimists
(Legler 2013). The wider point to pick
up is that regionalism is not free from
political and tactical use subject to a
continuing process of change. For a
wide array of voices, the malady lies in
the multiple layers of rudimentary
institutions that render cooperation
persistently dysfunctional. Overlapping
institutions and segmented regionalism
is an indicator of decentralized sub
regionalism and disintegration. Given
that governments DNA makes them
averse to surrendering sovereignty, all
initiatives remain subject to political
whims, haphazard and shallow
(Malamud 2013). This remains a
forceful argument, particularly if
anchored on trade as the handmaiden
for regional institution building. Much
of this argument builds upon prospects
of trade integration and focuses rather
narrowly on the relevance of a regional
power to propel institutionalization - to
a large extent reflecting the reliance on
the Western European template and,
more generally, what Alfred Hirschman
called “fracasomania”, a failure
complex that pervades analyses of
Latin America, all the roads leading to
see the region as a pathology stuck in
perennial failure.
The multiplex world of Acharya points
to the changing modalities of
engagement of developing countries in
relation to the twin development of a
waning US as hegemon and the
increasing footprint of China across the
globe (Acharya 2014; 2017). Building
cooperation is particularly difficult in a
unipolar system. Engaging with this
debate, Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012)
proposed that regionalism is about
setting minimum common
denominators as much as creating
spaces of co-operation for the design
and implementation of policies in
different domains. The important point
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advanced was that the sum of external
incentives, the outside--in dynamic,
was balanced with the inside--out
dynamic in regional politics. These
inside out dynamics became manifest
in a number of domains such as health
(Fourie 2013; Herrero and Tussie 2015;
Tussie Riggirozzi 2015), education
(Perrotta 2014), and security
(Battaglino, 2012), infrastructure
(Agostini and Palestini, 2020). Sectoral
analysis shows how cooperation can
thrive despite diversity. Policy
domains , never to be minimized, can
acquire a life of their own. A granular
focus shows intense statecraft, not just
rhetoric for public consumption.
U.S. hegemony is no longer absolute
The post hegemonic moment
could give new credence to post-
hegemonic regionalism as a conceptual
framework. Riggirozzi and Tussie
(2012) coined the concept of ‘post-
hegemonic regionalism’ to describe the
regional space as an opportunity
structure in which new political
consensus, particularly in the field of
social areas of cooperation, emerged
not only at odds with the role of the US
as regional/hemispheric power, but
also to for states to regain authority on
regional policy. The backdrop to the
notion is a crisis of hegemony and the
emergence of a world order of multiple
competitions which cannot be ordered
by a single line of control. In Latin
America the ability of the US to shape
regional discourses and institutions
suffered a serious blow with the
demise of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas in 2005. Latin Americans
united front and astute use of
hemispheric summits made relations
with Cuba a problem that Barack
Obama had to solve. We cannot write
off North American influence over
events south of its border but its
centrality is being displaced. In the
next section we will dissect how the
global transition is played out in a
leading policy domain, financial
governance as a result of the long
standing dissatisfaction of developing
countries with the rules of adjustment
and the wiggle room that comes from
rise of new financial powers. The
tipping point came with the global
financial crisis in 2008. As we shall see
with a granular focus there has been
intense statecraft, not just rhetoric for
public consumption, and not just a
straightforward path.
Latin American Post Hegemonic
Finance Initiatives. A journey and
current challenges [1]
At the country level, Nemiña
(2018) has shown a clear
posthegemonic pattern in the strategy
of “de-indebtedness” in the early
2000s which relied on the structure of
opportunity provided by the
posthegemonic global moment, an
opportunity that Greece seized as well.
De-indebtedness consisted in
cancelling debt with the International
Monetary Fund, in which the US holds
veto power and shifting borrowing
requirements to new external creditors
together with domestic
resources. With the wakeup call of the
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global financial crisis an opportunity
structure was manifest for monetary
cooperation (Trucco, 2012) but it
found very hard to reach significative
progress later on. In fact, concentrating
on structural factors rather than
agency, Trucco shows that the greater
the transformative goals of the
monetary agreement, the lower the
trade volume it conducted. The SUCRE
which involved the creation of a
common (virtual) currency for regional
transactions and hence with the
greatest post-hegemonic potential
showed negligible significance in the
volume of goods traded. As we will see
below financial cooperation faced
numerous obstacles with initiatives
that compete and overlap. Since we
are going to focus on the financial
governance, the institutions that we
are more interested in are the ones
regarding financial statecraft such as
regional banks, payment systems, and
alternative financial institutions. The
institutions we are going to analyze are
the Bank of the South, the Latin
American Reserve Fund, The
Development Bank of Latin America,
the Brazil National Bank of Economic
and Social Development and
Petrocaribe.
As Armijo & Katada (2015)
explained using defensive and systemic
financial statecraft is a way to resist
against influences from the global
financial markets. In the case of Latin
America, this strategy has been used
by many countries in the region.
Policies such as capital controls, the
use of public banks to implement
counter-cyclical policies and others
were used to avoid contagious of the
global markets. In other words,
interventionism was specially used as
an Argentinian and Brazilian strategy of
systemic defensive financial statecraft.
The case of the Bank of the South and
ALBA represent two examples of
regional offensive financial statecraft.
At the same time, the case of the Brazil
National Bank of Economic and Social
Development known under its
acronym as BNDES represents an
example of an offensive financial
statecraft at a bilateral level since is a
state own bank that started funding
the expansion of Brazilian companies.
Next, we analyze the main post
hegemonic financial initiatives
deployed in the region during the last
two decades, its range and current
main challenges.
The Bank of the South
The Bank of the South is a
development bank and a monetary
fund created in 2007 as an initiative of
the main left governors Nestor
Kirchner and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,
whose aim is avoiding the pattern of
the traditional financial organizations
led by US, and hence to attend regional
economic development needs. There
members are: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela. The
main goal of the bank was including
and open new ways and alternatives to
funding in the region and specially an
alternative to the Interamerican Bank
of Development, in which the United
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States is part off. At the change of the
century, the government projects in
Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay,
Ecuador, Nicaragua and Paraguay
where different from the liberalizing
trend before the 2000s and wanted to
distance from the regional integration
in which there is an American
domination. In other words, as Estay
(2018) says, it was a return to the
development agenda. It created
expectations around the possibility of
building an alternative regional funding
project, showing that the Bank was
created with an offensive regional
perspective. The foundational act of
the banks describes the institution as a
primary and essential of the new
financial and regional architecture with
the aim of financing the economic and
social development. The voting model
is one country one vote and avoids the
funding of the public sector, to put
emphasis in the state production. The
functioning organism of the bank is
formed with the council of economics
and finance and the council of
administration, while the executive
organ is the executive director. As
Ugarteche (2017) holds, the Bank of
the South was aimed since its origin to
being the base of development and
funding for the region, offering long
term lending in low interest rates for
funding infrastructure and other
relevant development projects, and
advancing in the development of a
regional monetary system. While some
authors define the Bank as a new type
of development banking, which
appears as one of the new regional
financial architecture pillars
(Castiglioni, 2013), others observe that
the internal financial structure did not
show significant differences from
traditional development banks,
although it propelled more consensual
internal governance (Molinari &
Patrucchi, 2020).
PETROCARIBE and the ALBA
Petrocaribe is an oil
cooperation forum or better named a
Hydrocarbon Agreement that involve
18 member states from the Caribbean
region which are: Antigua and
Barbuda, Belize, Cuba, The Dominican
Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, Suriname, Haiti,
Nicaragua and Guatemala until 2013. It
was funded in Venezuela in 2005. At
the core of the alliance was
Venezuelan supply of oil on
concessionary terms. Such offer
favored autonomy by counteracting
the effects of global economic
vicissitudes and by reducing signatories
need to fall back on traditional IFIs or
extra-regional donors for support. In
other words, Petrocaribe and ALBA are
regional initiatives with a clear
offensive strategy status. The
Venezuelan role in Petrocaribe is
central because provides soft loans to
energy-dependent Caribbean state by
allowing them to finance as much as 70
per cent of the cost of oil imports from
Venezuela. Behind the foundational
ideas of Petrocaribe lays the objective
of promoting a post – hegemonic
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regional order through the ALBA. The
latter appears as an organization
aimed to promote economic
cooperation in a broader sense, so it
includes energy integration (through
Petrosur, Petroandina, Petrocaribe and
CITGO), trade cooperation (through
the People’s Trade Agreement),
regional monetary integration based
on the SUCRE and aimed to permit
intraregional trade without resorting to
the use of the US dollar.
After the 2008 global financial
crisis, the two main attempts to create
regional financial cooperation where
the UNASUR and the ALBA (Ugarteche,
2017). The first objective of these
projects was to reinvest international
reserves inside the region instead of in
US government bonds; it also aimed
towards reducing the vulnerability of
the interregional trade. ALBA, in other
words, embodies the principle of
south-south cooperation and it was
designed as a response to the US-
backed Free Trade Area of the
Americas. Commercial and financial
measures have been at the heart of
the ALBA. In the agreement signed in
2004, the first substantive article
promises the greatest possible
exchange of goods and services
whereas its first concrete provision
applies a zero tariff to all imports into
Cuba from Venezuela and its second
one exempts all bilateral investments
from local taxes.
The ALBA governance consists
of a high body of the presidential
council, which directs initiatives and
settles policy at summits convened at
irregular intervals. This is supported by
social, economic and political councils
governed by ministers in those areas,
with the aforementioned Social
Movements Council at the same high
level of the organization’s hierarchy.
Last, the executive secretary is charged
with the execution, coordination and
monitoring of decisions from the
councils. In contrast, The Petrocaribe
governance is complex. The summit of
energy ministers represents the higher
level of governance with the support
from a nominal executive secretariat.
The management and monitoring of
the agreement’s application in the
Caribbean led to the creation of a
subsidiary of PDVSA called PDV Caribe.
When barrel prices reached $
100 after the global financial crisis,
Petrocaribe offered an average
financing to members equivalent to
2.5% of GDP (IMF, 2015: 36). However,
the financial crisis –then sociopolitical-
unleashed in Venezuela by the collapse
in oil prices eroded the sustainability of
these processes. This gave relevance to
another Southern Cone regional
financial cooperation driver: the
renovation of the Andean
Development Corporation (CAF) into
the Development Bank of Latin
America (CAF), which today has more
than 35 billion dollars in assets and
appears at present as the more
sustainable financial initiative.
The Development Bank of Latin
America
The Development Bank of Latin
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America still known by its founding
acronym (CAF) [2] was created in
1970s as the Andean Development
Corporation The Andean countries
since its beginning expressed the
willing of achieving the economic
integration of their countries in order
to accelerate the economic and social
development of their people.
Subsequently a host of other countries
joined from the Caribbean, Central and
South America. Portugal and Spain are
extra regional partners.
The CAF provides services to its
clients through technical assistance,
loans, equity investments and
guarantees. Through technical
cooperation, member countries
contracts specialized services in
activities compatible with CAFs
prioritized fields of action, with the
goal of enabling, strengthening and
generating value in its interventions
and facilitating the transfer of
knowledge. These operations may be
reimbursable or non-reimbursable or
based on contingent recover. CAF can
offer loans for specific operations or
credit lines to finance various
operations, with a time span ranging
from one to more than five years,
associated with investment or another
economic need or activity whose
market or technical characteristics,
economic, financial, environmental,
institutional and other aspects relevant
to the nature of the operation have
already been formulated by the client.
In third place, CAF can make equity
investments into public, mixed or
private businesses, new or existing
private financial institutions or vehicle
that are or have the potential to be
profitable and competitive at an
international level, that carry
reasonable risk or that promote human
development. Finally, CAF offers
guarantees to support its client’s
payment obligations.
Regarding capital, shares and
shareholders, the authorized capital is
USD 15 billion divided into ordinary
capital shares and callable capital
shares: the ordinary capital shares of a
total of 10 billion USD, distributed in
three series: A, B and C. Series “A”
comprises fifteen registered shares for
a value of USD 1,2 billion each for a
global amount of USD 18 billion to be
subscribed by the Government of each
Member Country or by public,
semipublic or private institutions as the
former may be designated. Series “B”
comprising 1,600,000 registered shares
for a global amount of USD 8 billion for
subscription by governments or public
semi public or private entities of
member countries. Last, Series “C”
comprising 396,400 registered shares
for a global amount of USD 1,9 million
for subscription by a legal entities or
natural persons from outside the
Member countries.
The CAF took impetus during
the rise of UNASUR and the commodity
boom because of the increase in the
available financing capital. The CAF
appeared as the main institution
promoting financial regional
cooperation, particularly during the
2008 financial crisis. The aim then was
to have access to financial support
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whereby Latin America retained
decisioning making in the board
(Humphrey, 2016). However, a
heightened banking logic limited the
contending impetus toward regional
hegemonic financial governance. For
long term development financing, the
CAF raises capital in private financial
markets through bond issuing and
other obligations. The need to secure
sufficient access in international capital
markets to function as a stable lender,
led CAF (as other development banks
do) to adapt their lending and financial
policies to the needs and perceptions
of the bond markets, private actors
and credit rating agencies (Humphrey,
2017). Thus, , for example ,the ability
to pursue straightforward or risky
development objectives may be limited
by the need to select the more
profitable projects that can retain AAA
bond rating).
Brazil National Bank for Economic And
Social Development (BNDES)
The Brazil National Bank of
Economic and Social Development is a
public bank created in 1952. The main
goal of the bank is to fund internal and
external projects to promote the
Brazilian economic development. The
BNDES is the most important
institution in terms of long term
infrastructure lending which have
given financial support to Brazilian
companies up to 11.2% of the GDP in
2015 (Armijo, 2015). The bank counts
with two main subsidiaries: FINAME
and BNDESPAR. Together they conform
the BNDES system. While FINAME
finances exports of Brazilian
equipment as well as imports of goods,
BNDSPAR capitalizes firms through
stock acquisitions. As a paradigmatic
state-owned development bank
(Lazzarini et al 2015), it is a financial
intermediary that specializes in
providing long term credit to promote
industrialization with a mandate to
support local business activity. BNDES
is restricted to Brazilian companies, but
being the second largest national
development bank among emerging
economies (Armijo, 2015) it is
manifestly a very powerful leader in
development finance.
During the 2000s, the BNDES
played a role in the internationalization
of Brazilian business, particularly its
policy of promoting national
champions, that is, specific firms
judged able to compete with the
largest transnationals in global
markets. But the BNDES has also
opened credit lines for foreign
governments to acquire Brazilian goods
and services, often from one or a
handful of companies. But more
importantly, the for the Brazilian
government BNDES role has been
offensive because it was attentive of
the South American market Specifically
the foreign direct investment of
Brazilian firms focused in South
America, especially Argentina and
Venezuela (Armijo, 2015).
As we can see the evolution of
post hegemonic financial cooperation
peaked and subsided with the regional
politics that directed available finance
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to support investment and
development. Post hegemonic policies
are is not a direct response to a
preponderance of power, but to
perceptions of power and fear of its
unilateral use. It responds to what Walt
(1985) called the “balance of threat”.
Post hegemonic regionalism is a
structure of opportunity that seeks to
limit the ability of the unipole to
impose its preferences on others
through coordinated action, attempts
to augment power, and countervailing
coalitions. It is manifest in the
conscious coordination of diplomatic
action in order to obtain outcomes
contrary to U.S. preferences, outcomes
that could not be gained if the partners




thrived in a structure of opportunity.
The outbreak of the coronavirus
pandemic in March 2020 hit a dis-
united Latin America. Has post-
hegemonic regionalism been buried?
Can it be buried? If we understand the
shift to the left symbolically initiated
with the election of Hugo Chávez in
1998 in Latin America, as a questioning
of the commercialist, neoliberal bias,
tempered with social policies in
response to demands for social
inclusion and an aspiration to more
equitable political-economic models,
then of course it has. Post-hegemonic
regionalism faces a conundrum. But it
does so in a moment where power
transition is played out not only in the
regional order but more so in a tense
multilateral order. In a broader
perspective, the post-hegemonic
moment as global power transition
lives on and it is played out in the
region by interactions with, and
between, the US and China as players
that strive for normative, financial and
economic constructions of global and
regional orders. China’s reach and
influence in Latin America has widened
considerably through lending,
investment and trade opportunities
hand in hand with extraordinary
vaccine diplomacy, that also includes
COVID-19 vaccine supplies from Russia.
Altogether they became
unprecedented high profile diplomatic
tools in the battles of the renewed
posthegemonic moment. The theory’s
parsimony retains considerable
appeal.
Latin America is not the only
region lacking a meta-narrative as
manifested in the emergence of
contested and even competitive
projects in the Asia while Europe
transits a process of disaffection. The
current context invites to reflect on
what a post-hegemonic moment might
bring as regions become terrain of
competing ambitions between the US
regaining pace in global politics and
China motorizing new forms of political
and economic diplomacy. 20 countries
have joined the China’s Belt and Road
Initiative while several Chinese firms
are positioned for the 5G
infrastructure. Meanwhile, Russia,
India and China create new sets of
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incentives for sectoral cooperative
policies, most recently in the face the
global health pandemic through
vaccine diplomacy. The key question
therefore is less whether there is an
institutional base and more one of how
regionalism can provide a structure of
opportunity giving expression to
political actors and policies.
If the XXI century turns out to
be the Asian century as the XX century
was the American century the meta-
narrative or master plan has yet to
come to fruition, but new dynamics in
which a variety of actors bring
emerging issues is making headway. It
is in this key that we propose that the
explanatory power of post-hegemonic
regionalism should be understood, as
an anti-deterministic perspective of
regionalism, reflecting varied political
logics and not easily reducible to a
single rule or expression of
deregulation.
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Notas
1) The authors would like to thank the
valuable assistance that Catalina
Espinosa provided to this section.
2) CAF acronym refers to Corporación
Andina de Fomento, as the Bank was
known until 2008.
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Abstract
This article proposes an analysis of the
development of post-hegemonic
strategies in Latin America during the
last two decades. In the second
section, we review the emergence of
the strategy and its meaning in the
light of multilateralism. In the next
section, we analyse in detail the main
initiatives in the financial sphere,
perhaps one of the fields in which the
region tried, with mixed success, to
dispute the status quo.
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